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SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
WORKPLACE EDUCATION AND REFORM, CIVIL
REMEDIES, AND PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
LisA PFENNINGER
N the wake of Anita Hill's allegations against Clarence Thomas,
the U.S. Navy's Talhook scandal, charges against Oregon Senator
Bob Packwood, and most recently, Paula Jones' suit against Presi-
dent Bill Clinton, the issue of sexual harassment has come under the
spotlight,' becoming the focus of studies, polls, workplace conversa-
tions, public debate, and political action throughout the United
States. Surveys of women in various professions, predating the
Thomas confirmation hearings, revealed a higher incidence of sexual
harassment of female attorneys than of other female professionals.2
Experts suggest that certain characteristics of the legal profession
make it particularly susceptible to sexual harassment.' Some of those
factors include long hours, frequent travel, partner autonomy, and
the entry of large numbers of women at junior levels.4 Indeed, at an
October 1990 meeting sponsored by the American Bar Association
and the American Law Institute, the managing partners of more than
half the represented law firms acknowledged investigating complaints
of sexual harassment in their offices.r Sexual harassment and other
forms of gender bias in the legal profession impede female attorneys'
abilities to serve their clients effectively. For example, overt judicial
expressions of gender bias in the courtroom undermine client confi-
dence in female attorneys, influence juror perceptions of their clients'
1. Thorn Weidlich & Charise K. Lawrence, Sex and the Firms: A Progress Report, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1, 22.
2. Carol Kleiman, Then and Now, Sexual Harassment Widespread, Cm. Tam., Dec. 9,
1991, at C3. The surveys reported the following incidences of sexual harassment:
Female U.S. Department of Labor Employees, 1987: 37%.
Female Federal Employees, 1988: 420.
Female Doctors and Medical Students, 1989: 270.
Members, National Association of Female Executives, 1990: 53%.
Female Lawyers In the Nation's 250 Largest Law Firms, 1989: 60%.
According to 1989 and 1993 NATIONAL LAW Joux surveys, the percentage of female attor-
neys who reported that they had experienced sexual harassment on the job fell from 6001o to 5107o
between those years. See Weidlich & Lawrence, supra note 1, at 22.
3. David Margolick, Curbing Sexual Harassment in the Legal World, N.Y. Ttnes, Nov. 9,
1990, at BS.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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cases, and can prejudice the outcomes of hearings, litigations, and ap-
peals .6
Sexual harassment of female associates in law firms7 adversely af-
fects employee morale and productivity. Furthermore, investigation
and litigation of the charges can be time-consuming and expensive and
jury awards to victims of sexual harassment significant. The publicity
surrounding the "war" against decades of sexual harassment in the
workplace may have particularly deleterious implications for female
associates beginning their legal careers. Washington, D.C. lawyer Ju-
dith Richards Hope commented that the law on sexual harassment has
made some people "overly sensitive and overly suspicious," which in
turn has made law firms "awkward and less collegial." ' If law firms
do not address the issue appropriately, one conceivable backlash of
the sexual harassment frenzy is that male partners will avoid friend-
ships and mentoring relationships with female associates. The impor-
tance to a new attorney of having a mentor who will introduce her to
judges, current and prospective clients, and influential members of the
local bar; take her along to assist with out-of-town depositions, hear-
ings, and trials; and teach her how to become a rainmaker; 9 cannot be
overstated. Mentoring is an integral part of a young attorney's train-
ing and her road to success in the profession. However, although
nearly half the lawyers entering into practice are female, nearly
ninety-five percent of all law firm partners (i.e., potential mentors)
are male.' 0 Many well-meaning, successful male attorneys who want to
reach out to promising female associates as mentors and friends may
understandably fear the possibility that their laudable intentions will
6. For example, a California appellate court recently cited biased remarks by a trial judge
as grounds for overturning a decision denying a woman in a divorce case a 50% share of her
millionaire husband's earnings during their marriage. The trial judge, questioning the woman's
claim that her husband, as a live-in lover, had been the first to propose marriage, asked: "Why
in heaven's name do you 'buy the cow when you get the milk free,' as we used to say." Phillip
Hager, Women Lawyers Get Advice on Countering Sexual Bias, L.A. TIsMS, Mar. 5, 1993, at B8
(discussing In re Iverson v. Iverson, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 70 (1992)).
7. For purposes of this Comment, the term "firm" or "law firm" may denote a private
firm or a legal department of a government agency, corporation, or other organization.
8. Saundra Torry, Thomas-Hill Case Prompts New Look at Sexual Harassment Policies,
WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1991, at FS.
9. "Rainmaking" is the generation of new business for the firm.
10. ABA Report: Women in Law Face Overt, Subtle Barriers, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 19, 1988, at
2, reports that 60o of the partners in private law firms are women. A 1984 National Association
of Law Placement survey found that 9% of all law firm partners are women. Karyn Feiden &
Linda Marks, Working Part Time: A Work Option that Can Reap Unexpected Benefits, 14
A.B.A. SEc. EcoN. L. PRAc. 26 (1988). Finally, Judge Wald's article states that 8% of the
partners in the country's 250 largest firms are women. Patricia M. Wald, Breaking the Glass
Ceiling: Will We Ever Rid the Legal Profession of 'The Ugly Residue of Gender Discrimina-
tion'?, 16 A.B.A. SEc. I DrmuAL RTs. & RaSP. 40 (Spring 1989).
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be misconstrued." Henning of Hildebrandt Inc., a Chicago-based
consulting firm, also suggested that men who are nervous about being
accused of sexual harassment will not work with female colleagues on
matters requiring out-of-town travel, which will result in discrimina-
tion against women in the delegation of assignments. 12
At the very least, partners might exclude female associates from val-
uable after-hours hobnobbing during which dealmaking and network-
ing take place, to avoid having to "walk on eggshells" so as not to say
or do something that might be deemed inappropriate. At worst, firms
and other legal employers may try to avert the risk and uneasiness
altogether by hiring as few female attorneys as possible. As Elaine
Weiss, the staff director of the ABA Commission on Women in the
Profession, summarized the problem, "This is an economic issue that
affects a woman's ability to travel on the job, to entertain clients, to
get constructive criticism, to relocate and [to] grow within the profes-
sion." 3
This Comment does not suggest, however, that enforcement of sex-
ual harassment laws is at the root of the problem. Precisely because
employers have turned a blind eye to workplace harassment and be-
cause society has expected and required women to tolerate intolerable
circumstances, a condition of continued employment for decades, the
situation finally escalated into an uprising. This Comment proposes as
a solution that, rather than continuing to counsel women that they
must either succumb to unwanted advances and tolerate degrading
comments or seek employment elsewhere, law firms foster comforta-
ble working relationships between men and women. Firms may ac-
complish this by eliminating workplace harassment and by sensitizing
both sexes to the other's viewpoint and encouraging them to develop a
mutual understanding of what standard of behavior both deem ac-
ceptable. '4
This Comment examines the problem of sexual harassment in law
firms and the various solutions that have emerged to address it. Part I
examines studies and individual accounts of sexual harassment and
gender bias in the legal profession, particularly in law firms. Part II
distinguishes between the two types of sexual harassment, defines the
contours of the sphere of conduct that constitutes sexual harassment,
and explains the legal standard employed in Title VII claims. Part III
11. Weidlich & Lawrence, supra note I, at 23.
12. Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in
Law Firms, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1989, at 46, 48.
13. Id. at 52.
14. This Comment defines sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For more detail about the elements of sexual harass-
ment, see infra part I1.
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discusses individual and law firm liability for sexual harassment and
suggests measures that law firms can take to prevent sexual harass-
ment and protect against firm liability for sexual harassment when it
does occur. Part IV surveys the various causes of action and remedies
that are available to redress victims of sexual harassment, the limita-
tions of each, and possible barriers to their applicability. Part V con-
cludes by suggesting that the American Bar Association, state
legislatures, and state bars should require employers to educate the
legal workplace about sexual harassment and to subject attorneys to
professional discipline for sexual harassment and other discriminatory
conduct.
I. Ti NATURE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Gender bias studies conducted by state supreme court task forces
reveal that sexual harassment is prevalent in every jurisdiction, is usu-
ally not reported, and goes largely unremedied even when it is re-
ported. 5 Very few victims of sexual harassment file formal charges, 6
and when they do, most firms prefer to avoid adverse publicity by
settling meritorious claims. 7 Thus, the reported cases are a poor re-
flection of the magnitude of the problem.' This section provides some
notion of the scope of the sexually harassing activity and other types
of gender bias that reveal themselves in the legal workplace, through
the recital of recently publicized incidents and survey results.
A. Incidence of Sexual Harassment
Recent studies suggest that more than half of female attorneys have
experienced sexual harassment in the legal workplace. Fifty-six per-
cent of the female litigators who responded to a nationwide Prentice-
Hall Law & Business survey conducted in February 1993 reported that
they had experienced sexual harassment by law firm colleagues or op-
posing counsel within the previous five years.' 9 In a 1993 National
Law Journal survey of 800 women and men in large law firms in four-
teen major cities, 51% of female attorneys (including nonlitigators)
15. By 1990, 14 state gender bias task forces had reported, and 14 others were still at work.
Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward a Courtroom of One's Own: An Appellate Court Judge Looks
at Gender Bias, 61 U. CiN. L. REv. 1209, 1211 (1993) (citing Gail D. Cox, Reports Track Dis-
crimination, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 1). Among the states reporting were Florida, 1990;
Maryland, 1989; Nevada, 1988; New York, 1986; Rhode Island, 1987; Minnesota, 1989; Michi-
gan, 1989; Missouri, 1993; New Jersey, 1984; Washington, 1989; Massachusetts, 1989.
16. Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment by Judges, 45 U. Mima L. Rev. 817, 818 (1991).
17. Margolick, supra note 3.
18. See Angel, supra note 15, at 818.
19. Women Litigators' Survey Results Reported, THE COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1993, at 32.
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reported that they had experienced sexual harassment on the job.20 A
1992 study found that 600 of female lawyers practicing in the area
encompassed by the ninth federal appellate circuit had been sexually
harassed by other lawyers, judges, or clients.2 ' Finally, the results of a
Florida Bar poll conducted in 1993 revealed that 41% of the female
respondents had seen sexual harassment in a law firm or a legal work-
place and 2907o had experienced it themselves.22
B. Gender Bias in the Courtroom
Sexual harassment and other gender bias in the courtroom take
many forms, 23 but the incidents reported by task forces are similar
across the states.24
The Report of the New York Task Force on the Status of Women in
the Courts concluded that "gender bias against women ... is a
pervasive problem with grave consequences.... Women uniquely,
disproportionately and with unacceptable frequency must endure a
climate of condescension, indifference and hostility." The reports
documented ... [that] gender bias affects women in all the roles
they play in the judicial system-court employees, attorneys, jurors,
witnesses, judges, and litigants."
One typical complaint is that judges frequently address female law-
yers by their first names, or by endearments such as "sweetie,"
20. Weidlich & Lawrence, supra note 1, at 22 (examples of sexual harassment given by
respondents included unwanted looks, gestures, being touched, pinched, cornered or leaned
over, and unwanted pressure for sex or dates).
21. Ivfark Hansen, 9th Circuit Studies Gender Bias: Survey Finds 60 Percent of Female
Lawyers Sexually Harassed in Last Five Years, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 30 [hereinafter 9th
Circuit) (examples of sexual harassment given by respondents included demeaning treatment
such as being addressed as "honey," "dear" and "little girl").
22. Gary Blankenship, Women lawyers report unequal treatment, FLA. BAR NEWS, Aug. 1,
1993, at 1, 1 [hereinafter FLA. BAR] (examples of sexual harassment given by female respondents
were comments on their appearance, assuming women lawyers were secretaries or assistants, and
addressing women by their first names or endearments such as "sweetie," "honey," or "little
lady").
23. The topic of sexual harassment by judges, to the extent addressed by this Comment, is
discussed below in section V. This section focuses on gender bias in the courtroom generally.
Actually, the kind of behavior described in this section, taken as a whole, might be sufficient
to create a hostile working environment (one of the two types of sexual harassment actionable
under Title VII), albeit of a lesser magnitude than is present when more egregious behavior is
involved. See infra part I. The distinction between the biased behavior described in this section
and that examined in part V lies in the sexual nature of the behavior discussed in part V.
24. Abrahamson, supra note 15, at 1211; see Cox, supra note 15, at 24; Lynn H. Schafran,
Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 JUDICATURE 280, 281
(1987).
25. Abrahamson, supra note 15, at 1211 (quoting REPORT OF THE NEW YoRK TASK FORCE
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE COURTS 5 (1986)).
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"honey," "little girl," and "girlie," while male attorneys are ad-
dressed with a title or as "gentlemen. ' 26 Another common complaint
is that male judges and attorneys make comments in court about the
anatomy of women lawyers and make remarks or jokes demeaning
women. 27 One female attorney reported that in addition to the judge's
practice of addressing her through the use of endearments, he called
her "menopausal" when she objected to a ruling. 21
Many female respondents report that women in the courtroom are
initially assumed to be court reporters or legal assistants and some-
times are asked to prove they are attorneys, whereas such requests are
rarely made of male attorneys. 29 Nancy Nicol, a lawyer of fourteen
years' experience and president of the Women's Bar Association of
Illinois, recalled standing before the bench with opposing counsel, a
man fifteen years her junior, and being asked, after the judge glanced
back and forth between the attorneys, whether she was a lawyer. Op-
posing counsel was not asked the same question. 0 One Florida judge's
comment to a female attorney was more egregious: he told her he
would like to see her dressed in a see-through suit.3" Another Florida
judge, while hearing a case in which a man had set his wife on fire,
revealed his disrespect for women by singing "You light up my wife"
to the tune of You Light Up My Life.3 2
Women have recovered money damages for sex discrimination by
judges. 33 Regarding a case in which a male trial judge refused to hire a
woman as a court reporter because his wife did not want him traveling
with a woman, Judge Shirley Abrahamson opined:
Many male judges supported his decision despite state laws that
prohibit sex discrimination in hiring. Unfortunately many of these
male judges viewed court personnel as their personal employees, to
be hired on the basis of their personal whims. It seemed to me that
26. See supra note 15; see, e.g., FLA. BAR, supra note 22, at 4; 9th Circuit, supra note 21, at
30; REPORT OF THE Missoum TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND JUSTICE, reprinted in 58 Mo. L. REV.
485 (Summer 1993) [hereinafter Mo. TASK FORCE].
27. See supra note 15; see, e.g., Mo. TASK FORCE, supra note 26, at 632-33.
28. See 9th Circuit, supra note 21, at 30.
29. See supra note 15; see, e.g., FLA. BAR, supra note 22, at 4; Mo. TASK FORCE, supra note
26, at 634.
30. Laurie Spurr, Times changing for women lawyers, but bias battle goes on, Cm. TRm.,
Mar. 30, 1993, at 2.
31. See FLA. BAR, supra note 22, at 4.
32. GENDER BIAS STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER
BIAS STUDY COMMISSION 121 (1990).
33. Abrahamson, supra note 15, at 1212; cf. supra note 6 (biased trial judge remarks were
cited by appellate court as reason for overturning decision denying woman in a divorce case 50%
of her husband's vast wealth).
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the wife's views were interfering with the male judge's ability to do
his job in accordance with state law. If he could not combine
marriage and career, should he not leave the bench, rather than force
a qualified woman applicant to forfeit her opportunity for
employment?34
C. Sexual Harassment and Other Sex Discrimination in Law Firms
The following recently publicized accounts provide some notion of
the scope of sexual harassment and other sex-based discriminatory be-
havior that takes place in law firms today.
1. Sexual Harassment in Law Firms
Three female lawyers and a female administrator filed suit against
the San Diego law firm of Sulzner & Belsky, alleging that the men at
the firm at all times referred to female attorneys by the use of a sexu-
ally explicit epithet, told jokes at their expense, mandated that women
wear skirts so that the men could see their legs, hired female attorneys
at salaries .'significantly lower' than those offered to male lawyers,"
and fondled some of them." One of the attorneys told of a case where
she was assigned to assist one of the partners shortly after she was
hired. During trial, he surprised her by announcing that she would
cross-examine a key witness, and when she replied that she might not
have sufficient time to prepare, he called her a "wimp," said he was
disappointed in her, ran his hands up and down her thigh, talked
about her 'making it up' to him," stuck his tongue in her ear, and
propositioned her . 6
fn July 1992, a Houston court was scheduled to hear the case of
two paralegals and three other female staff members who alleged that
an attorney forcibly touched their private areas and breasts, lowered
his pants in their presence without their consent, and compelled one
paralegal to "'engage in acts of sexual intercourse and oral sodomy
against her will."' 7 During the period when the incidents occurred,
the attorney was promoted to partner."
34. Abrahamson, supra note 15, at 1212.
35. Alan Abrahamson, 4 Women Accuse Law Firm of Fraud, Sexual Harassment, L.A.
Tnas, June 6, 1992, at B2.
36. Id.
37. Phillip M. Perry, Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession, MAss. LAW. WKLY., May
17, 1993, at SI.
38. Id. The case was resolved, and "by agreement of the parties, there can be no discussion
of any resolution of the case." Interview with William V. Wade, esq., counsel for plaintiffs,
William Wade & Associates (July 27, 1994).
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A former associate sued the law firm of Reed Smith Shaw & Mc-
Clay, claiming that her mentor at the firm, "a high-profile Republi-
can politico," pressured her into sleeping with him three times by
promising to assist her in making partner, yet she was fired after end-
ing the sexual relationship. 9 Jurors found that the partner harassed
her but only held him liable in money damages for slandering her be-
fore the trial began.- °
One woman who left her practice at a large Florida law firm to
become a full-time professor reported sexual harassment as the reason
for her career change:
Before the incidents of sexual harassment, which continued daily for
about eight months, my career was going well and it was clear from
my evaluations that I would become partner in the next year. One of
the senior partners, however, made it clear on several occasions that
my advancement in the firm hinged on providing him with sex.
When I refused to do this and reported it to my supervisor and
'mentor,' who was on the firm's sexual harassment committee, he
made it clear that I had to 'make that man happy or get out' ... I
got out.41
In February 1993, General Counsel of Morgan Stanley & Co. re-
signed amid claims of sexual harassment by three fired female em-
ployees, including his secretary.4 1
A former female associate in the New York office of Paul, Hast-
ings, Janofsky & Walker filed a complaint with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that, even after she
complained to other partners in the firm, one partner continued to
subject her and other females to unwelcome sexual comments and to
address them using demeaning and sometimes vulgar terms, and that
the firm retaliated against her for complaining of the sexual harass-
ment by giving her lower performance evaluations .4
Eleven years ago, while Elizabeth Hishon's sex discrimination suit
was pending in the United States Supreme Court, attorneys at Atlan-
ta's King & Spalding wanted to hold a "wet T-shirt" contest featuring
the firm's female summer associates. Instead, they held a swimsuit
competition, the winner of which was offered a position with the firm
39. Amy Bach, Taking Lawyer to Task for Sexual Harassment, AM. LAW. 32 (Oct. 1993).
40. Id.
41. FLA. BAR, supra note 22, at 1.
42. Jay W. Waks, Curbing Sexual Harassment in the Firms, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at
16, 16 (citing NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at 3).
43. Id.; Margolick, supra note 3.
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because, according to one partner, "[s]he has the body we'd like to
see more of.""
In another well-publicized case, Catherine Broderick filed suit
against the Securities and Exchange Commission, claiming it was "a
sexual playground" for the male attorneys. 45 The male attorneys were
in the practice of touching the female personnel during office parties,
making crude sexual remarks about the women's appearances, and en-
gaging in other conduct demeaning to women.4 Moreover, female em-
ployees who provided sexual favors to the attorneys were rewarded
through favoritism, cash awards, and rapid advancement. 47
A female accountant at the New York law firm of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom filed an action against the firm and the de-
partment manager in 1992, alleging that the manager made her ad-
vancement contingent on her having sex with him. 4 He allegedly had
entered her office often, locked the door, sat on her desk, stared at
her, and touched her without her permission. 49
A secretary who found a remote-controlled video camera hidden
under her desk filed a sexual harassment claim against the law firm of
Boyd, Murray and Wick. An attorney at the firm who eventually ad-
mitted to having put the camera there was fired.50
2. Other Forms of Sex Discrimination in Law Firms
Sex discrimination in law firms does not always take the form of
overt harassment. For example, one female attorney polled by the
Florida Bar wrote: "Partners in my firm stated that they like to hire
female attorneys because [female attorneys] work harder for less
money and don't cause trouble." 5' Another added: "A law firm of all
male partners routinely hires female associates, works them to death
for a few years on garbage cases and pays them the minimum possible
until they resign in utter frustration. The law firm then hires new fe-
male associates at the same low pay.''2
Several female associates responding to the poll said they had been
asked to handle typing and clerical errands, while male associates had
44. Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 12, at 46.
45. Perry, supra note 37.
46. Id. Broderick won $120,000 in backpay and interest, plus the promotions she had been
denied. Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 12, at 51.
47. Perry, supra note 37.
48. Waks, supra note 42, at 16.
49. Id.
50. Camera Under Desk Prompts Lawsuit, S.F. CHmoN., Nov. 5, 1993, at D6.
51. F.A. BAR, supra note 22, at 4.
52. Id.
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not.5 3 "Many said male associates get the better assignments, better
pay, and quicker promotions. '5 4 Another respondent reported that
male attorneys in her firm regularly took clients to clubs that do not
allow women or minorities, or to topless bars, and the firm pays the
bills. 5
A woman offered a position as an associate at the Pennsylvania
firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, who later sued the firm
for discriminatory denial of partnership, was told at the time of her
initial employment offer that she would have a hard time at the firm
because she did not fit the Wolf Block mold, partly because she was a
woman 56
Against the backdrop of these examples, which demonstrate the
scope of sexual harassment and other sex-based discrimination in the
legal workplace, it is appropriate to define sexual harassment and to
examine the analytic framework within which Title VII cases based on
sexual harassment are decided.
II. WHAT IS SEXUAL HARASSMENT?
Legally, sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7 In the landmark
case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,5" the Supreme Court, draw-
ing from the EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 9
recognized two types of sexual harassment that are actionable under
Title VII: "quid pro quo" sexual harassment and "hostile environ-
ment" sexual harassment o
The Code of Federal Regulations defines sexual harassment as fol-
lows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when
53. Id. The Florida Bar mailed questionnaires to 4,805 in-state bar members in its 1993
Gender Equality In The Profession Survey, and 1,469 attorneys responded, 790 of which were
female. The total response rate was 31%, which is very high for a "lengthy, controversial mail
survey." Telephone interview with Mike J. Garcia, Senior Planning and Evaluation Analyst,
The Florida Bar (July 26, 1994).
54. Supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (E.D. Pa.
1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
58. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985). The EEOC Guidelines are not binding upon the courts.
Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
60. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
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(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
a term or condition of an individual's employment,6'
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual,
or62
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.63
The conduct described in subsections (1) and (2) constitutes what is
known as "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, whereas subsection (3)
describes "hostile environment" sexual harassment.
Whether specific conduct amounts to sexual harassment is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined in light of all the circumstances.64 Cir-
cumstances may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance; and whether it causes psychological
harm.6 1 However, no single factor is determinative. 66
In most cases, the determination is based on the perspective of a
reasonable person under similar circumstances .67 However, some juris-
dictions have adopted a "reasonable woman" standard to evaluate
whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently offensive to disrupt
the work environment. 8
A. Elements of a Title VII Sexual Harassment Claim
To succeed in a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII, an
employee must allege and prove five things: First, the employee must
61. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(1)(1993).
62. Id. § 1604.11(a)(2).
63. Id. § 1604.11(aX3).
64. Id. § 1604.11(b); accord Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69.
65. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 370.
68. 3rd Circuit: See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990);
6th Circuit: See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); 8th Circuit: See Jensen
v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 (D. Minn. 1993) ("reasonable woman" standard
used in certifying class of more than 100 plaintiffs); llth Circuit: See Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991); 9th Circuit: See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). "Under this standard, 'a female plaintiff states a prima facie case of
"hostile work environment" sexual harassment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable
woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment."' Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the
Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAn. LAW. 203, 203 (1992) (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879).
N.J.: See Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993).
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belong to a protected group.69 If the sexual harassment plaintiff is fe-
male, this element of proof requires nothing more than a stipulation
to that effect. 70
Second, the employee must show that he or she was subject to sex-
ual harassment. 7' The harassment must be unwelcome both in the
sense that the employee did not solicit or incite it, and in the sense
that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive. 72
Third, the plaintiff must show that the harassment complained of
was based on the plaintiff's sex. 71 Stated differently, this element re-
quires proof that, but for the fact of his or her gender, he or she
would not have been the object of the harassment.
Fourth, the harassment complained of must have affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment.74 To state a Title VII claim for
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment, the employee must show that sub-
mission to unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition
for receiving job benefits or that refusal to submit to the advances
resulted in tangible job detriment. 7 On the other hand, the employee
is not required to prove "economic" or "tangible" discrimination to
state a Title VII claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment. 76
Fifth, where an employee seeks to hold the employer responsible for
a "hostile work environment" created by the employee's supervisor or
coworker, some circuits require that the plaintiff show the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment7 7 and failed to take
prompt, effective remedial action. 78 In contrast, an employer is strictly
liable for "quid pro quo" sexual harassment by its supervisors. 79
B. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
The typical rendition of the standard of conduct upon which one
may base a claim of "hostile work environment" sexual harassment
69. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 904.
75. Giordano v. William Patterson College, 804 F. Supp. 637, 642 (D.N.J. 1992) (emphasis
added).
76. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
77. Other circuits have adopted less demanding standards for employer liability. See infra
notes 121-27 and accompanying text, section on The Standard for Employer Liability.
78. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
79. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 70-71; Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.9 (Ilth Cir.
1982); Sowers v. Kemira, 701 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
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states that the behavior must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment." ' 0 The Vinson standard requires both an objec-
tively hostile work environment and the victim's subjective perception
that the environment is hostile.," However, there is no requirement
that the plaintiff prove that his or her tangible productivity declined
as a result of the harassment.12 Moreover, the conduct need not even
result in concrete psychological harm to the employee to be actionable
under Title VII as "abusive work environment" sexual harassment. 3
1. Hostile Environment Not Found
One requisite element for stating an actionable sexual harassment
claim based on a hostile working environment is that the offending
conduct be pervasive and regular.84 A single instance of sexually pro-
vocative or suggestive conduct by a superior is not sufficient.8 5 Title
VII does "not create a claim of sexual harassment for each and every
crude joke or sexually explicit remark made on the job by employees,
even supervisors." 6 As a rule, joking, teasing, and conversation that
may include sexual connotations may not necessarily rise to the level
of "hostile work environment" sexual harassment under Title VII.87
Accordingly, the mere utterance of an epithet which engenders offen-
sive feelings in a female employee would not affect employment con-
ditions enough to violate Title VII.88 As one court aptly explained,
Title VII is not "a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by
the hypersensitive." 8 9 Similarly, without more, the fact that a female
employee finds racist sexual cartoons in her supervisor's desk drawer
while performing job duties is insufficient to state a claim for "hostile
80. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (brackets and quotation marks omit-
ted).
81. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
82. Id. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d
345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989)); accord Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372
(Scalia, J., concurring).
83. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 371.
84. Kuhn v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 450, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 16
F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 1993).
85. Id.
86. Downes v. FAA., 775 F.2d 288, 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
87. Fox v. Ravinia Club, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 797, 801 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 948 F.2d 731 (1lth
Cir. 1991).
88. Pagana-Fay v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 797 F. Supp. 462, 468 (D. Md.
1992).
89. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
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work environment" sexual harassment, so long as the employee is not
forced to view the cartoons. 90
Finally, a plaintiff cannot state a claim for "hostile work environ-
ment" sexual harassment where the incidents of sexual harassment
creating the "hostile work environment" were not directed at the
plaintiff.91
2. Hostile Environment Found
Cases in which "hostile work environment" sexual harassment has
been found sometimes may involve physical contact. In Stockett v.
Tolin,92 repeated acts of sexual harassment by the employer's manag-
ing agent included sexually explicit, degrading, and vulgar language
and repeated acts of physical abuse and culminated in a threat to fire
the plaintiff if she did not have intercourse with him. These acts were
sufficient to establish "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, "hostile en-
vironment" sexual harassment, and constructive discharge in violation
of Title VII, in addition to several torts.
Successful "hostile work environment" claims also have been prem-
ised on visual references to sex, provided the circumstances viewed as
a whole were "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment."' 93 For example, a district court held an employer liable for
maintaining a hostile working environment in Jensen v. Eveleth Taco-
nite Co. 94 There, the court found that visual references throughout the
employer's facility to sex and to women as sexual objects, in a work
environment characterized by language derogating both females gen-
erally and the plaintiffs in particular, and sexually motivated physical
acts upon female employees, reflected a sexualized, antifemale atmos-
phere and a hostile working environment. 9
In another case, involving no physical acts, the court based em-
ployer liability almost exclusively on an employee's subjection to ex-
tremely vulgar and sexually explicit graffiti in the workplace, some of
which was present for at least two years, even though some of the
90. Williams v. Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., 805 F. Supp. 890 (D. Kan. 1992).
91. See Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079 at *4-*5 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 10, 1993); Buskus v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D.
Ark. 1990), aff'd, 951 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1991).
92. 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992). This case is discussed infra part IV.D. 1.
93. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. City of Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
94. 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993).
95. Id. at 879-80.
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graffiti was not on grounds controlled exclusively by the employer. 96
The court held the employer had a duty to take prompt remedial
measures to eradicate the graffiti from the workplace. 97 The judge in
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. ,9 found sexually explicit pic-
tures in that workplace, sometimes directed at the plaintiff, so appall-
ing that he ordered all sexually suggestive images removed from the
workplace immediately and barred employees from displaying, pos-
sessing, or viewing such materials in their private workspaces at any
time. 99 His rationale for imposing such a broad order was that sexu-
ally suggestive images of women undermine women's equality,
thereby fostering an environment ripe for violations of Title VII's
prohibition on sex-based employment discrimination. 10
The facts of Boyd v. James S. Hayes Living Health Care Agency,
Inc.101 illustrate yet another form of behavior constituting "hostile en-
vironment" sexual harassment. At issue in that case was the conduct
of a male superior toward a female employee during a business trip.
The male supervisor insisted that the employee come to his hotel
room, provided her with wine, turned the television to a sexually ex-
plicit movie, attempted to restrain her departure, and slammed the
door behind her when she left. 102 The case highlights the fact that con-
duct can constitute sexual harassment under Title VII even if a supe-
rior does not explicitly invite his employee to enter into a sexual
relationship with him and does not force one on her.
Finally, it is important to note that conduct need not have clear
sexual overtones to constitute sexual harassment but may instead con-
sist of nonsexual conduct that ridicules women, treats them as infe-
rior, or is intended to intimidate them. 03
III. LiABnrry, PREVENTION, AND PROTECTION
A. Law Firm Liability
The EEOC guidelines impose an affirmative duty on employers to
96. See Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
97. Id. at 611.
98. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
99. See id. at 1526.
100. Id.
101. 671 F. Supp. 1155 (W.D. Tenn. 1987).
102. Id. at 1158-59.
103. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988); Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 929 (M.D.
Ala. 1992); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Halbrook v. Reichhold Chemns., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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eliminate and prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. 1 4 Accord-
ing to the guidelines, employers are responsible for the actions of their
agents and supervisors.loS Additionally, an employer is liable for the
actions of all other employees if the employer knew or should have
known about the sexual harassment and failed to take "immediate
and appropriate corrective action."'10
The definition of employer under Title VII applies to the relation-
ship between partners and associates in law firms.107 Thus, law firms
are subject to liability for sexual harassment. 08 If a law firm partner
expressly or impliedly promises to consider an employee for partner-
ship, that promise is a "term, condition, or privilege of ...
employment '"' 09 giving rise to a Title VII cause of action by an associ-
ate who is denied partnership for discriminatory reasons, including
the associate's refusal to surrender to a partner's advances.' 0 How-
ever, existing case law does not support a Title VII claim by a female
partner or shareholder against her law firm partnership or corpora-
tion. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon v. King &
Spalding"' made clear that "[t]he reasoning of the Court's opinion
does not require that the relationship among partners be characterized
as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII would apply. The
relationship among law partners differs markedly from that between
employer and employee-including that between the partnership and
its associates.""' In addition, several circuit courts have specifically
held that partners in partnerships and shareholders in incorporated
104. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993).
105. Id. § 1604.11(c).
106. Id. § 1604.1 1(d). As indicated supra note 59, these guidelines do not bind the courts.
107. Under Title VII, "employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1988). Section 2000e(a) defines "person" to include partnerships, associations, and
corporations, among other entities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).
108. See, e.g., lsaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079, at *9 (N.D.
I1l. Mar. 10, 1993) (partners in a law firm are employers both within the meaning of Title VII
and for purposes of tort actions based on sexual harassment); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr &
Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (law firm held liable for its discriminatory fail-
ure to promote a female associate to partnership status). Ezold was later reversed, but the rever-
sal was based on the merits of the discriminatory motive claim; the applicability of Title VII to a
law firm employer was not disputed. 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Lucido v. Cravath,
Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding a law firm organized as a partner-
ship with more than 400 employees qualifies as an employer within the meaning of Title VII).
109. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76 (1984).
110. Id. at 76-77.
111. Id. at 79.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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law firms are not employees and therefore are not entitled to bring a
Title VII action against their firm. " 3
1. The Standard for Employer Liability
The standard for determining whether an employer is liable for sex-
ual harassment by its agents depends upon whether the agents' behav-
ior constitutes "quid pro quo" sexual harassment or "hostile work
environment" sexual harassment. In "quid pro quo" cases, harassing
employees act for the company, holding out the employer's benefits as
an inducement to the employee for sexual favors. Accordingly, in a
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment case, the employer is strictly liable
for its employees' unlawful acts." 4 The standard of employer liability
for "hostile work environment" sexual harassment, on the other
hand, is less clear.
(a) Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
The United States Supreme Court considered at length the issue of
the proper standard for employer liability for "hostile work environ-
ment" sexual harassment."' The Court rejected the plaintiff's sugges-
tion that under EEOC guidelines" 6 the employer should be held liable
for its agents' acts without regard to whether the employer had notice
of those acts."' However, the Court also rejected the defendant's view
that the mere existence of a grievance procedure, coupled with the vic-
tim's failure to avail herself of that procedure, should shield an em-
ployer from liability." 8 The EEOC, in tension with its own guidelines,
argued for a rule adopting the defendant's view in the "hostile work
113. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.) (holding partner in law firm partner-
ship not an employee), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 986 (1987); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736
F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding shareholders in law firm organized as a professional
corporation not employees); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding partners
of accounting firm not employees for purpose of Title VII).
Some federal appeals courts have examined the actual role of the partner to determine whether
the partner is an employee within the meaning of Title VII. Under this "economic realities" test,
a partner's employment status is analyzed by examining whether the partner has assumed attrib-
utes of ownership such as unlimited liability, capital contributions, profit sharing, and manage-
ment. See, e.g., Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., P.A., 925 F.2d 1398 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
member/shareholder of a professional corporation was not an employee entitled to bring suit
under Title VII, as evidenced by profit and loss sharing, expenses, and voting rights). In either
case, a Title VII claim by a female partner or shareholder in a law firm will almost always be
barred by the employee status requirement.
114. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 905 n.9 (11 th Cir. 1982); Sowers v. Kemira, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Ga.
1988).
115. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 69-73.
116. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985).
117. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72.
118. Id.
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environment" context." 9 The Court refused to issue a definitive rule,
and instead, stated that Congress intended for courts to consult
agency principles for guidance in Title VII claims. The Court noted
that while Congress apparently meant to limit employer liability for
acts of employees to some extent, it did not necessarily intend absence
of notice alone to insulate the employer from liability.' 20
(b) The Standard for Employer Liability after Vinson
In response to Vinson, three standards have emerged among the
United States Courts of Appeals for determining Title VII employer
liability for the acts committed by employees within the scope of em-
ployment. Most circuits have adopted the pre- Vinson standard, basing
employer liability on the doctrine of "respondeat superior."'' The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied this standard in Henson.12
Under this standard, employer liability is contingent upon a finding
that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge of the
harassment: '[L]iability exists where the defendant knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
action.''"' 2
Other circuits have followed the Restatement (Second) of Agency's
approach.' 24 Under this approach, an employer who is aware of the
sexual harassment in the workplace is liable if it acts negligently or
recklessly by failing to take "reasonable steps to eliminate such offen-
sive conduct.' '125
119. Id. at 71.
120, Id. at 72.
121. 1st Circuit: See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (lst Cir. 1988);
3rd Circuit: See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cit. 1990). 4th Cir-
cuit: See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557-58 (4th Cit. 1987); 5th Circuit: See Waltman
v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1989); 6th Circuit: See Rabidue v. Os-
ceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); 11th
Circuit: See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989); Cronin
v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 928 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Robinson v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1529-31 (M.D. Fla. 1991). The extent to which coworkers
and supervisory personnel actually knew of the harassing behavior is a good barometer of the
employer's constructive knowledge. Id. at 1531.
122. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
123. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486 (quoting Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316).
124. RESTATEhMNT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). 2nd Circuit: See Lopez v. S.B.
Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir. 1987). 10th Circuit: See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co.,
833 F.2d 1406, 1417 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing the Supreme Court's rejection in Vinson of an
absolute requirement of actual or constructive notice, rejects the "'knew or should have known"
standard and adopts in its place the Restatement standard).
125. Lopez, 831 F.2d at 1189.
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Finally, a third group of federal circuit courts employs a negligence
standard for employer liability for "hostile work environment" sexual
harassment. 26 According to this standard, an employer will be liable
"if it delays unduly or if the action it does take, however promptly, is
not reasonably likely to prevent the misconduct from recurring.' 127
2. Protecting the Firm
Sexual harassment causes significant costs, whether the enterprise is
private, public, legal or nonlegal. A 1988 Working Woman study of
the effect of sexual harassment on Fortune 500 companies revealed
that approximately 24% of harassment victims use leave time to avoid
the harassment; 10% resign, citing harassment as their reason; 5%
quit without explanation; and the 500o who remain and attempt to
deal with the harassment show a 10% decline in productivity. 2  The
survey found that sexual harassment costs the typical Fortune 500
company $6.7 million per year in absenteeism, employee turnover, de-
pressed morale, and lost productivity. 29 The additional costs of liti-
gating or settling sexual harassment suits and of the harm to the
company's public image are often substantial as well. 130 A similar 1988
survey of sexual harassment in the federal workplace conducted by the
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board estimated that between 1985 and
1987, absenteeism due to harassment, replacement of employees who
left their jobs, and reduced productivity cost the federal government
$267 million.' Moreover, a firm's liability insurance policy is likely
to exclude from coverage employment-related claims, sexual abuse
claims, or both. 132
126. 7th Circuit: See Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1990); 8th
Circuit: See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 1988); 9th Circuit: See
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504,
1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. Guess, 913 F.2d at 465.
128. AMEICAN BAR ASSOCIATION Co S' hsIoN ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, LAWYERS AND
BALANCED LivEs: A GUIDE TO DRAFTING AND IMPLEMENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICIES FOR
LAWYERS 4 (1st ed. 1992) [hereinafter ABA COMsa'N ON WOMEN] (citing Ronni Sandroff, Sexual
Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69; and KLEIN ASSOCIATES,
TiE 1988 WORKING WOMAN SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 2, 29-35 (1988)).
129. KLEIN ASSOCIATES, THE 1988 WORKING WOMAN SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 2, 2
(1988).
130. Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988,
at 69.
131. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 128, at 4 (citing Sexual Harassment in Federal
Agencies Found Still Prevalent, Costs Millions, 6 BNA's EMPLOYEE REt. WKLY., July 11, 1988,
at 879).
132. See, e.g., Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assocs., Inc., 2 F.3d
105 (5th Cir. 1993).
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The Supreme Court has warned that failure to adopt and implement
a written policy specifically intended to remedy sexual harassment
bears on an employer's liability exposure.133 Federal employment regu-
lations add that "[aln employer should take all steps necessary to pre-
vent sexual harassment from occurring, such as affirmatively raising
the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise
the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to
sensitize all concerned.""' 4 As a practical matter, an effective sexual
harassment policy is needed to reduce a firm's vulnerability to the per-
sonal and financial costs of diminished productivity, collegiality, and
morale; increased absenteeism; a work environment pervaded by mis-
trust; litigation; and unfavorable publicity.
(a) Drafting an Effective Policy
The ABA's Commission on Women in the Profession provides a
pamphlet containing detailed discussion of the essential elements of a
sexual harassment policy, how to implement a sexual harassment pol-
icy, and how to respond to and resolve complaints. 3 ' This Comment
provides only brief highlights; a law firm interested in drafting and
implementing its own policy should consult the ABA pamphlet di-
rectly. A comprehensive sexual harassment policy, however, should
include each of the following:
1. A strong statement of the firm's policy against sexual harassment;
2. A clearly articulated definition of sexual harassment, which
includes examples of behavior constituting verbal and physical sexual
harassment;
3. Identification of individuals covered under the policy, including
outside vendors and consultants, whose harassment may expose the
firm to liability as well;
4. Procedures to be followed in response to sexual harassment
complaints, including guidelines to ensure confidentiality and protect
complainants from retaliation;
5. A statement of disciplinary consequences;
6. An explanation of the appeals process;
133. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-73 (1986).
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993).
135. See ABA COMM'N ON WOAMN, supra note 128, at 5, 15.
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7. A mechanism for implementing and monitoring the policy;
8. Mandatory educational and training programs, repeated regularly;
9. A commitment to act in response to circumstances suggesting
sexual harassment, even in the absence of a formal complaint;
10. A cautionary note regarding the potential consequences of law
firm romances; and
11. Sensitivity training to promote respect and understanding and to
head off a possible backlash response by male partners and
associates who may otherwise avoid close working relationships with
female employees.136
Additionally, the National Law Journal suggests that upon becoming
aware of a romantic relationship between personnel, law firms may
rearrange reporting functions so that problems relating to unequal
power do not arise. However, the Journal cautions that a sex-based
rearrangement that disadvantages the subordinate is equally unaccept-
able. '37
(b) Ensuring Effective Enforcement
As discussed below in subsection (c), a sexual harassment policy will
not shield an employer from liability for the sexual harassment of its
agents unless the employer takes the necessary steps to ensure effective
enforcement of the policy. The ABA Commission on Women's guide
to drafting and implementing sexual harassment policies for lawyers
and a 1993 National Law Journal article suggest several measures that
law firms may take to curb workplace harassment and protect them-
selves against liability:
(1) Communicate the policy to all employees, vendors, and clients.
Ways to do this include posting the policy in a common area, printing
the policy in an employee handbook; distributing the policy directly to
each employee; conducting mandatory periodic workshops on sexual
harassment and other forms of sex discrimination; holding an orienta-
tion training session on sexual harassment for entering associates and
new administrative staff and lateral hires; and stating in the sexual
harassment policy that the firm will investigate and remedy harass-
ment by outsiders, possibly resulting in termination of the business
relationship.
(2) Educate those responsible for enforcing the firm's policy about
the policy and about the psychological effects of sexual harassment,
and train them to receive and respond to complaints appropriately.
136. See ABA CoMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 128, at 6, 15; Waks, supra note 42, at 20.
137. See Waks, supra note 42, at 20.
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(3) Designate someone other than the employees' immediate super-
visor to receive complaints. For example, a law firm may form a com-
mittee consisting of members drawn from both attorneys and staff
from each of the firm's offices.
(4) Investigate the complaint and take appropriate action as soon as
possible after the complaint. Subsection (c) below explains the stan-
dard for this requirement.
(5) Conduct employee surveys and exit interviews to detect sexual
harassment.
(6) Include "refrain from sexual harassment" among work per-
formance evaluation criteria.'
(c) Prompt and Effective Remedial Action
Once a plaintiff has proven that her employer had the requisite no-
tice of the "hostile work environment" (in jurisdictions that require
actual or constructive notice), an employer can avoid liability by prov-
ing that it took "prompt, effective remedial action."'3 9 The employ-
er's response is ineffective if 'it delay[ed] unduly . . . [and] the
action it [did] take, however promptly, [was] not reasonably likely to
prevent the misconduct from recurring."140
Courts consider several factors in judging whether an employer's
response to a complaint of sexual harassment was prompt and effec-
tive. First, courts examine whether and how soon after the complaint
the employer investigated the alleged acts of harassment, and the type
of investigation the employer conducted. 14 Second, courts consider
the employer's post-investigation remedial steps. 42 Finally, courts
evaluate effectiveness by ascertaining whether the harassment ceased
after such steps were taken. 43
Courts are split as to whether a good faith investigation, even if it
does not result in disciplinary action, is nevertheless sufficient to con-
138. See ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 128, at 15; Waks, supra note 42, at 20.
139. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
see also Giordano v. William Paterson College, 804 F. Supp. 637, 643 (D.N.J. 1992).
140. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1531 (quoting Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463,
465 (7th Cir. 1990)).
141. Giordano, 804 F. Supp. at 643; see Foster v. Hillside, 780 F. Supp. 1026, 1039 (D.N.J.
1992); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987).
142. Giordano, 804 F. Supp. at 643; see Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d
1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1989).
143. Giordano, 804 F. Supp. at 644; see Foster, 780 F. Supp. at 1039; Steele, 867 F.2d at
1 316.
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stitute "prompt, effective remedial action."t1 The general rule is that
a good faith investigation is sufficient if the harassment ends. 4 A:
meeting with the complainant and the alleged harasser probably is not
sufficient if it fails to end the harassment. 46 Similarly, an oral warn-
ing following an investigation is sufficient if the harassment ceases. 147
If the harassment continues despite the oral warning, then further ac-
tion is necessary.'14 Essentially the same rule applies to written warn-
ings. 149
Prompt investigation and transfer of the alleged harasser is suffi-
cient under appropriate circumstances. 10 However, a transfer of the
harasser to another supervisory position may support a determination
that the employer was willing to permit the malfeasance to continue
and may thus form the basis for employer liability.'
In Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,'-" the court considered the ap-
propriateness of transferring the victim as a corrective measure. In
Guess, the alleged harasser was promptly reprimanded, ordered to
stay away from the plaintiff, and denied a promotion and a merit
raise." 3 No further incidents of sexual harassment occurred thereaf-
ter.5 4 However, the plaintiff argued that transferring her, rather than
her harasser, out of the department was improper, even if effective. 5'
144. Examples of cases concluding that the investigation was sufficient include Carrero v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 668 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (good faith investigation result-
ing in cessation of the harassment), modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Sapp v. City of
Warner Robins, 655 F. Supp. 1043, 1049-50 (M.D. Ga. 1987); and Smith v. Acme Spinning Co.,
40 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104, 1107 (W.D.N.C. 1986).
For a case holding the employer liable despite "token" efforts to address complaints, see
Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1023 (E.D. Ark. 1991),
rev'd, 981 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1992).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 978-79
(S.D. Fla. 1989); Delgado v. Lehman, 665 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D. Va. 1987).
147. Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1313, 1316 (1lth Cir. 1989); Hud-
dleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 903-04 (11 th Cir. 1988).
148. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 421; Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 916, 920-22
(D. Conn. 1989).
149. See, e.g., Swentek, 830 F.2d at 556, 558 (written warning sufficient where harassment
ceased); Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp., 693 F. Supp. 369, 380-81 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (prompt reme-
dial action not found where employer gave alleged harasser written warning based only on what
the latter had admitted, delayed initiation of investigation and did not interview alleged harasser
for two weeks although employee had been threatened).
150. Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix Corp., 828 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1987); Hinton v.
Methodist Hosps., Inc., 779 F. Supp. 956 (N.D. Ind. 1991).
151. See Cline v. GE Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. III. 1991).
152. 913 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 464.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 465.
196 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 22:171
While the court agreed that a transfer which reduces a plaintiff's sal-
ary, increases the burdens of work, or impairs her prospects for pro-
motion would be ineffective per se, it noted that the plaintiff's
transfer in that case was distinguishable because she was no worse
off.5 6 The plaintiff, who had been on temporary assignment in the
department in which she experienced the harassment, merely returned
to her regular employment after she completed her temporary assign-
ment. 11
7
To summarize, education and a comprehensive sexual harassment
policy that is enforced will go a long way toward preventing work-
place harassment. Lawyers in firms with such policies consistently re-
port fewer incidents of sexual harassment than those in firms without
policies." 8 However, without appropriate reporting mechanisms, in-
cluding a pool of trained individuals to whom incidents of harassment
may be reported, and strict enforcement practices, the mere existence
of a policy is neither likely to deter potential violations nor likely to
shield the firm from liability. Therefore, it is essential that every re-
port of alleged harassment be investigated as soon as possible and that
prompt and effective remedial action be taken when a violation is
found.
B. Individual Liability
Individual liability for sexual harassment serves the two purposes of
Title VII: to compensate victims of discrimination and to deter future
discrimination. 59 Courts have reasoned that firm partners and share-
holders can be held individually liable because they are employers
within the meaning of Title VII. 6W
In Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate,'6' both the offending party and
a third party were held subject to personal liability. 162 After the plain-
tiff complained about sexual harassment and obscene phone calls by
156. Id.
157. Id. at 465.
158. Weidlich & Lawrence, supra note 1, at 22.
159. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 2, 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) ("congres-
sional findings" and "purposes of amendments" sections).
160. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (shareholder attorneys
with certain characteristics in an incorporated law firm are Title VII employers); Burke v. Fried-
man, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding partners in accounting firm are liable as employers
under Title VII); Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 10, 1993); Ruich v. Ruff, Weidenaar & Reidy, Ltd., 837 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. [1]. 1993)
(legal secretary sued law firm and individual partner for sexual harassment; as partner in the
partnership-employer, he, too, was legal secretary's "employer"); Janopoulos v. Harvey L.
Walner & Assocs., Ltd., 835 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (holding owner of a professional
corporation is an employer).
161. No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1993).
162. Id. at *4.
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another partner, the head of the plaintiff's practice group stopped giv-
ing the plaintiff substantive work assignments, discouraged other at-
torneys from doing so, and began to exclude the plaintiff from firm
activities.'63 The practice group leader also responded in a hostile
manner to the plaintiff's subsequent attempt to inquire about the
other partner's status.'l Three years later, soon after the plaintiff re-
ported a request the other partner made of her to alter the dates on
some documents relating to a transaction, the legality of which she
had questioned, the plaintiff was further stripped of her responsibili-
ties in the firm, given negative evaluations, and told that the firm was
contemplating terminating her employment. 6 5
The court recited the rule that only employers and agents can be
held liable for retaliatory actions under Title V1I.166 It added that any
individual who "authorizes, directs, or participates" in the discrimi-
natory conduct is an agent and may be held liable. An allegation,
however, that an agent merely knew about the conduct and did noth-
ing to stop it is insufficient to impose individual liability.167 The court
concluded that both partners were subject to personal liability to the
plaintiff because their actions were sufficient to support a finding that
they both participated in the discriminatory conduct.?6 In sum, indi-
vidual partners are subject to individual liability either for conduct
that amounts to sexual harassment or for authorizing such conduct.
IV. CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964169 and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991170 provide statutory causes of action not only for sexual ha-
rassment, but also for discriminatory failure to promote and for con-
structive discharge, in which sexual harassment often culminates. The
remedies available under Title VII to victims of discrimination are
committed to the discretion of the trial courtY.7
163. Id. at*1.
164. Id. at *4.
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id. at 03.
167. Td.
168. Id. at *4.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. It 1990).
170. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
171. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-17 (1975); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1988).
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1. Remedies Before the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Before enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,"72 Title VII reme-
dies were limited to tangible losses. 73 A plaintiff who succeeded on a
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment claim was entitled to reinstatement
and back pay, lost employment benefits, costs, and attorneys' fees.174
A successful victim of "hostile work environment" sexual harassment
could enjoin the defendant(s) and could recover reasonable costs and
attorneys' fees, but could not recover compensatory or punitive dam-
ages. 175 In either case, the benefit of a remedy conditioned upon the
plaintiff's return to the harassing worksite must be seriously ques-
tioned.
2. Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended the 1964 Act to entitle Title
VII plaintiffs to jury trials and to expand the available remedies to
include compensatory and punitive damages. ' 7' Defendants will now
be subject to liability for declaratory or injunctive relief and a plain-
tiff's reasonable costs and attorney's fees, if a plaintiff proves that his
or her sex was a "motivating factor" underlying any employment
practice, even if other factors also motivated the employment deci-
sion. 77 However, a plaintiff will not be entitled to reinstatement,
backpay, or money damages if the defendant establishes that it would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible mo-
tive. '71
3. Discriminatory Failure to Promote
To state a claim for discriminatory failure to promote, a plaintiff
must allege the following: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group;
(2) plaintiff applied for and was qualified for a position for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (3) plaintiff was rejected despite
qualifications; and (4) the position was filled by or held open for
someone not belonging to the protected group. 7 9 The following two
cases illustrate the point, because both involve Title VII suits based on
a firm's failure to promote a female employee to partnership status.
172. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
173. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g) (1988).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(a)(1), (b), (c) (West Supp. 1993).
177. Id.
178. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (West Supp. 1993).
179. Halbrook v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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In the first, the employee succeeded on the merits of her case, and in
the second the plaintiff failed.
In the widely publicized case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,180 the
United States Supreme Court held that an accounting firm organized
as a partnership could be held liable for sex discrimination under Title
VII. Ann Hopkins worked at Price Waterhouse for five years when
the partners nominated her for partnership. 8' Of the 662 partners
then at the firm, only seven were women.1 8 2 The district court found
that Hopkins had "played a key role in Price Waterhouse's successful
effort to win a multi-million dollar contract with the Department of
State" and that "none of the other partnership candidates ... had a
comparable record in terms of successfully securing major contracts
for the partnership." '83 In the joint statement supporting her candi-
dacy, Price Waterhouse partners praised Hopkins' character as well as
her accomplishments. 1 The Supreme Court stated that evidence that
the firm's decision to place her "on hold" rather than elevate her to
partnership status that year was based, in part, on evaluations that
included suggestions that she be required to take a course at charm
school and that her flawed interpersonal skills could be corrected with
makeup and more feminine attire. This, the Court held, was sufficient
to establish that sex stereotyping played a part in the decision.'83 On
remand, the trial judge determined that Price Waterhouse did not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its failure to make
Hopkins a member of the partnership was based on nondiscrimina-
tory concerns. 86 The judge ordered the firm to admit Hopkins into
the partnership and held the partnership liable for backpay . 8
7
Contraposed against the Price Waterhouse decision is Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 8 in which a female law firm as-
sociate charged that she was passed over for promotion to partnership
180. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
181. Id. at 233.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 234.
184. Id.
185. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989).
186. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 920 F.2d 967, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
187. The trial court ordered that she be offered a partnership effective July 1, 1990, with
compensation and benefits as if she had been admitted to partnership on July 1, 1983. But be-
cause she had not tried hard enough to find equivalent work in the intervening years, she was
awarded backpay (including interest) of only $371,175. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F.
Supp. 1202, 1215 (D.D.C. 1990), aff d, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
188. 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).
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status for discriminatory reasons. Although the trial court ruled for
the plaintiff, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed.'8 The district court found that: (1) the plaintiff, Ezold, was
given a negative evaluation expressly because of her involvement with
women's issues in the firm; (2) a male associate's sexual harassment of
female employees at the firm was deemed "insignificant" and not
mentioned to the Associates' Committee before the partnership deci-
sion; (3) Ezold was evaluated negatively for being very demanding,
while male associates were evaluated negatively for lacking assertive-
ness; and (4) Ezold 'was the target of several comments demonstrat-
ing [the firm's] differential treatment of her because she is a
woman."' 190 On appeal, the parties did not dispute that Ezold had
demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination and that, in partic-
ular, she was qualified for admission into the partnership. 91
However, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court's find-
ing that the firm's asserted reason for its denial of promotion was a
pretext for discrimination. The court noted that the lower court's
finding was based on irrelevant comparisons of Ezold's strengths to
those of males admitted to the partnership, in several different catego-
ries of the firm's evaluation form other than those relating to legal
analytic ability. 92 Such comparisons were irrelevant because the issue
was whether the firm's articulated basis for its decision, that Ezold
did not possess legal analytic ability sufficient to handle complex liti-
gation, was pretextual. Several partners, including some who favored
promoting Ezold to partnership, had expressed clear concern about
Ezold's legal analytic abilities. 93 Ezold's evaluations in this category
were not as good as those of even the least capable male associate who
was offered a partnership position.' 94 Also, Ezold herself admitted
that because of the nature of the firm's litigation practice, its litigators
devoted much more time to legal analysis than to in-court trial
work.19 The Third Circuit explained that the district court improperly
based its decision on its own disagreement with the great weight and
high standard the firm placed on analytic ability in its evaluation of
candidates for partnership.1'9 The Third Circuit then reaffirmed its
189. 983 F.2d at 509.
190. Id. at 513.
191. Id. at 523.
192. Id. at 524-26.
193. Id. at 526.
194. Id. at 525. The portions of the partners' evaluations of Ezold dealing with her legal
analytic ability are set forth in 983 F.2d at 518-20.
195. Id. at 526.
196. Id. at 528.
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position that it is the firm's prerogative to employ its evaluation proc-
ess however it deems most appropriate using its business judgment.
The court concluded that Ezold failed to produce evidence showing
that her legal analytic ability was comparable to that of male associ-
ates who were offered partnership positions. 19 7
Women's rights advocates argued that the Third Circuit's decision
"reinforced the 'glass ceiling' for women in the legal profession.''
Although a rule requiring absolute deferral "to the judgment of the
discriminators" 199 would indeed grant employers carte blanche to con-
tinue to engage in discriminatory employment practices undaunted by
the threat of liability, one must seriously question whether the Third
Circuit's mandate may be read so broadly. Although there was some
evidence that discrimination played a part in the firm's evaluations of
Ezold, it is not clear that the decision to deny Ezold partnership status
was not in fact attributable to her failure to meet the high standard of
legal analytic ability required of partners in that firm's practice. Had
the partners who favored her admission to the partnership given her
high ratings in that category, or had the firm's practice involved little
complex litigation, or had there been some evidence that the decision
was retaliatory, or had Ezold's achievements been more comparable
to those of the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse,2® the Third Circuit
would have been obliged to defer to the district court's judgment.
Such was not the case in Ezold, however, and thus, the conclusion
that the Third Circuit's holding requires trial judges to give absolute
deferral to the judgment of alleged discriminators is unwarranted.
4. Constructive Discharge
Evidence of a discriminatory refusal to promote is not always suffi-
cient to support a finding of constructive discharge. Generally, Title
VII requires employees to attack discrimination from within existing
employment relations.' Thus, constructive discharge occurs only
when an employer 'deliberately makes an employee's working condi-
tions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary
resignation." ' 20 2 The standard for finding constructive discharge re-
197. Id. at 527, 533.
198. See Beth Kuhles, Ezold Reversed; Glass Ceiling Reinforced?, N.J. LAW., Jan. 11, 1993,
at 1.
199. Id.
200. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
201. Halbrook v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
202. Id. (quoting Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983)).
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quires a determination of how a reasonable person would behave '"in
the employee's shoes.' '
'P2 3
It is fairly difficult to succeed on a constructive discharge claim be-
cause, as in the discriminatory refusal to promote context, even if a
plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the defen-
dant need only demonstrate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory rea-
son for its action to rebut the presumption of discrimination. 204
Although theoretically, the plaintiff can still succeed by proving the
employer's proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination,
courts have held plaintiffs to a very high standard of proof. 2 5 This is
probably because courts recognize the various subjective factors that
enter into promotion decisions and that such decisions are founded on
employers' intimate familiarity with day-to-day occurrences uniquely
within the knowledge of the parties. 206 Stated differently, courts are
reluctant to invoke the limited information available to them to im-
pose liability based on their second-guess of an employer's informed
business judgment. Consequently, absent proof of an admission of
discrimination by an employer or one of its agents, a plaintiff claim-
ing constructive discharge is unlikely to be able to sustain the burden
of proof that the nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer
was pretextual. 20 7
For example, a former assistant general counsel of Reichhold
Chemicals, Inc., brought a Title VII suit alleging that she was denied
a promotion to the position of general counsel and was constructively
discharged on the basis of her sex.2m In that case, the plaintiff, Hal-
brook, was subjected to several incidents of sexual harassment. She
was told to read a book on women's alleged fear of success, told not
to let women's issues get in her way, and forced to strike a "bargain"
with management whereby she promised to refrain from raising wom-
en's issues in exchange for a promise from management to cease ha-
rassing her about maternity leave. 209 After the plaintiff had been
employed for five years as the general counsel's second-in-command,
a man whom she had trained and who had worked under her supervi-
203. Id. (quoting Pena, 702 F.2d at 325).
204. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (West Supp. 1993).
205. See, e.g., Halbrook v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that evidence was insufficient where it failed to prove employer's nondiscriminatory
reasons were a pretext) (see infra text accompanying notes 208-213), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1159 (2d
Cir. 1992); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992), discussed
supra text accompanying notes 180-91.
206. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 527 (3d Cir. 1992).
207. See supra note 205.
208. Halbrook v. Reichhold Chem., 735 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
209. Id. at 123.
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sion was promoted to general counsel. Shortly thereafter, Halbrook
complained to the former general counsel about this decision, in gen-
eral terms and without reference to sex discrimination. The former
general counsel responded by volunteering that "it was intentional
that there [were] no women in top management at [the corporation]"
and that the vice president of human resources at the corporation was
of the opinion that women are difficult to manage.210 After the pro-
motion to general counsel of the man she had trained, Halbrook's
responsibilities were decreased. 21' The court concluded that Halbrook
had proffered sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory refusal to promote and constructive discharge. 2 2 Nev-
ertheless, the evidence was deemed insufficient to prove, at a subse-
quent trial on the merits, that the employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason for passing the plaintiff over for promotion
was pretextual. 23
B. State and Local Human Rights Statutes
Many states have human rights statutes analogous to Title VII.214
Local ordinances may afford similar relief to employees of organiza-
tions having fewer than fifteen employees. 215
C. State Workers' Compensation Statutes
Whether a sexual harassment victim may recover under a state
workers' compensation act depends on whether there is a sufficient
relationship between the injury and the employment "to make the in-
jury arise out of and in the course of the employment. ' 216 Courts also
have found that some instances of sexual harassment can be consid-
ered accidents within the meaning of the statute.217
If there is a physical injury, courts will look at whether the risk of
sexual assault was connected to the conditions where the employee
worked and whether the incident took place where the employee
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 121.
213. See Halbrook v. Reichhold Chem., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 956
F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1992).
214. See, e.g., Florida Human Rights Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 760.01-. 10 (West Supp. 1993)
(prohibiting sex-based discrimination by employers having 15 or more employees).
215. See, e.g., Laborers' Int'l Union v. Burroughs, 541 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 1989).
216. Jane Goodson, et al., How Sexual Harassment Victims Are Fighting Back, 20 A.B.A.
SEC. INDIvmuAL RTS. & REsp. 10 (Spring 1993).
217. Id.
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would be expected to be while performing employment duties.2 1 1
Stress-related consequences of sexual harassment are generally com-
pensable under workers' compensation acts and may be the only rem-
edy available because of the exclusivity doctrine of the acts.219 Mental
injuries fall within the definition of "injury" under most state work-
ers' compensation laws, although some states have restricted their def-
initions of "injury.' 220
In states where the consequences of sexual harassment are compen-
sable under workers' compensation acts, there are three categories of
cases. First, physical injuries resulting from a mental stimulus are al-
most always compensable. Second, under most statutes, when physi-
cal trauma is amplified or prolonged by depression, neurosis, or a
personality disorder, the full disability is compensable. Third, some
jurisdictions also have allowed recovery for nervous injuries caused by
a mental stimulus. 2 1
D. Tort Actions
1. Judicial Circumvention of Workers' Compensation Exclusivity
Provisions
The exclusivity provision of an individual state's workers' compen-
sation law, stating that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy
for work-related injuries, may bar tort and contract claims. 2  How-
ever, recent court decisions have treated injuries arising from sexual
harassment as exceptions to the exclusivity provision. 22 Such cases in-
voke the phrase "neither covered nor barred [by the Workers' Com-
pensation Act]" and reason that because injuries from sexual
harassment are not covered by that state's workers' compensation act,
tort claims are not barred. 2u Other courts have held that although sex-
ual harassment arose in the course of employment, it was not a "risk
218. Id.
219. Id. The exclusivity doctrine holds that tort and contract claims are barred because
workers' compensation laws provide the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. See infra
note 222 and accompanying text.
220. Goodson et al., supra note 216.
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1990).
223. Goodson et al., supra note 216; see Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, No. 92-C3105,
1993 WL 68079 at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 1993) (holding intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims not preempted by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act; IWCA only insulates
employers from accidental injuries and does not preempt claims for intentional torts, so that if
the employer or his alter ego intended injury to the employee, the claim is not barred).
224. Goodson et al., supra note 216.
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of employment" and therefore did not come within the ambit of the
act. 221 The Ohio Supreme Court in Kerans v. Porter Paint Co. 2 6
pointed out that victims of sexual harassment suffer intangible inju-
ries that may require remedies beyond the economic compensation
provided by workers' compensation laws; whereas workplace injuries
rob a person of resources, sexual harassment also robs an individual
of his or her dignity and self-esteem. 2 7
In Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities Inc., 21 the Florida
Supreme Court invoked state and federal public policy to make a
powerful statement against using the exclusivity doctrine to shield em-
ployers from sexual harassment claims:
There can be no doubt ... that both the state of Florida and the
federal government have committed themselves strongly to outlawing
and eliminating sexual discrimination in the workplace, including the
related evil of sexual harassment .... Applying the exclusivity rule
of workers' compensation to preclude any and all tort liability
effectively would abrogate this policy, undermine the Florida Human
Rights Act, and flout Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This,
we cannot condone. 229
In the 1992 Florida case of Stockett v. Tolin ,230 involving sexual ha-
rassment of a female employee by her male employer, the court found
sufficient evidence to establish the torts of battery, invasion of pri-
vacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprison-
ment. Thus the court found the plaintiff entitled to compensatory and
punitive damages in addition to the Title VII remedies of back pay
and front pay based on the employer's "quid pro quo" sexual harass-
ment, "hostile environment" sexual harassment, and constructive dis-
charge.211 In Stockett, the defendant repeatedly harassed the plaintiff,
both physically and verbally, throughout her term of employment. 212
Examples included pressing down on the plaintiff's shoulders while
225. See, e.g., Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 Cal. 3d 1420, 1430 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1987); see also Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec. Inc., 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 n.7 (Fla.
1989) (To be barred, "the injury must 'arise out of' employment in the sense that it is caused by
a risk inherent in the nature of the work in question.") (emphasis added).
226. 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991).
227. Id. at 431.
228. 552 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1989).
229. Id. at 1102, 1104; see also Gomez v. Metro Dade County, 801 F. Supp. 674, 683 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) (interpreting Byrd as holding that workers' compensation statute does not bar a claim
of negligent supervision and retention).
230. 791 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1542.
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she was seated so that she could not get up, then reaching over and
squeezing her breasts; pinning the plaintiff against a wall and refusing
to allow her to escape; following the plaintiff into the ladies' bath-
room; sticking his tongue in the plaintiff's ear while propositioning
her in crude terms; cornering her and then proceeding to run his fin-
gers up the front of her shirt, grab her breasts and pinch her nipples;
and making vulgar demands for sex as a condition of continued em-
ployment. 23
3
2. Types of Tort Actions
The court in Stockett noted that other courts considering emotional
distress claims have consistently held "that the allegations sufficient
to state a claim for sexual harassment are sufficient to state a claim
for emotional distress, and have generally found what one court called
'a common thread-a continued course of sexual advances, followed
by refusals and ultimately, retaliation." '234 The elements of the tort
are: (1) extreme and outrageous; (2) intentional or reckless disregard
by a coworker or supervisor for the probability of causing severe emo-
tional distress; (3) that resulted in severe emotional distress; and (4)
for which the employer is somehow responsible.135
Courts have created their own standards of proof for this tort in
sexual harassment cases. 236 Due to most states' public policy against
sexual harassment, courts generally have not required strong evidence
of intent or outrageousness by the coworker or supervisor to establish
a cause of action. 27 For example, in Ford v. Revlon, Inc.,238 a corpo-
rate employer was held liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress where an employee's complaints and corporate policies and
guidelines for handling sexual harassment claims were completely dis-
regarded.29 In Bryant v. Thaihimer Bros., Inc.,240 a North Carolina
court upheld a jury verdict finding an employer liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress upon his former employee. In that case
the employer made sexual advances and followed with false accusa-
233. Id. at 1542-43. The vulgar comments included "I want to fuck you" and "Fuck me or
you're fired."
234. Id. at 1555 n.4 (quoting Shaffer v. National Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909, 915 (E.D.
Pa. 1983)).
235. Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
10, 1993).
236. See infra notes 237-44.
237. Goodson et aL., supra note 216; see, e.g., Cremen v. Harrah's Marina Hotel Casino,
680 F. Supp. 150 (D.N.J. 1988); Kerans v. Porter Paint Co., 575 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1991); Mc-
Calla v. Ellis, 446 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
238. 734 P.2d 580 (Ariz. 1987).
239. Id. at 585-86.
240. 437 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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tions and false performance reviews after the employee rejected his
advances. 241
Florida courts, in contrast, have been less receptive of intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims based on sexual harassment.
For example, in Ponton v. Scarfone,24 2 the Second District Court of
Appeal, while acknowledging that Florida recognizes the tort, held ut-
terances by an employer attempting to induce his employee to engage
in sexual relations with him did not descend to the level necessary to
state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 43 Moreo-
ver, the court stated that whether conduct is so "atrocious, and ut-
terly intolerable in a civilized community" as to constitute intentional
infliction of emotional distress is a question of law to be evaluated
objectively by the judiciary without regard to the subjective response
of the target of such behavior.'" Thus, Florida courts are likely to
hold victims to a strict standard of proof of the outrageousness of the
behavior upon which a claim of intentional infliction is premised.
Sexual harassment victims may be able to state a claim for assault
or battery, particularly where physical injury or a threat of physical
injury was involved. A person acting with the intention of causing
harmful or offensive contact, or of causing another to experience im-
minent apprehension of such contact, is subject to liability for as-
sault.245 Furthermore, a person acting with intent either to cause
harmful or offensive contact or to cause imminent apprehension of
such a contact, and who causes a harmful or offensive contact, is sub-
ject to liability for battery.24 Physical behavior such as groping, fon-
dling, and kissing a female employee may constitute battery.247
However, words alone are insufficient to constitute either assault or
battery .24
The invasion of privacy tort consists of four distinct wrongs: "1)
the intrusion upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion; . . . 2)
241. Id. at 521.
242. 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1985).
243. Id. at 1011.
244. Id.
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1977).
246. Id. § 13.
247. See, e.g., Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F. Supp. 1536, 1555-56 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Stewart v.
Thomas, 538 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1982); see also Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 588
A.2d 760, 767 (Md. 1991) (holding that fellow employee's placement of his hands on woman's
shoulders during attempts to bite her breast were sufficient to support jury finding of assault and
battery); Newsome v. Cooper-Wiss, Inc., 347 S.E.2d 619, 621 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, No.
72555 (1986) (holding that frequent unauthorized touching of secretary by employer could con-
stitute actionable battery).
248. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 31 (1977).
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publicity which violates the ordinary decencies; 3) putting the plaintiff
in a false ... position in the public eye; and 4) the appropriation of
some element of the plaintiff's personality for a commercial use." 49
The first of these wrongs is the one most likely to be implicated in
sexual harassment cases. The Restatement defines it as the intentional
intrusion, "physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person. ' 250 Courts have held that
acquisition of information from a plaintiff is not a requisite element
of "wrongful intrusion" invasion of privacy. 25 ' Thus, liability for this
tort can be premised upon a defendant's invitation to engage in sexual
acts and inquiries about a plaintiff's sexual experiences, practices, or
inclinations, even if the plaintiff declines the invitation and does not
answer the inquiries. 25 2
In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Alabama applied the wrongful intrusion theory of the inva-
sion of privacy tort to patterns of sexual harassment. 253 The court held
that it was not necessary for the defendant to invade some physically
defined space, as opposed to the plaintiff's psychological integrity.25 4
The court also held the defendant was responsible to the plaintiff for
the treatment of severe emotional problems that were proximately
caused by his tort.25 Persistent and unwelcome phone calls have also
been held to be an invasion of privacy in the sexual harassment con-
text .2516
Many sexual harassment plaintiffs include in their complaints a def-
amation count, often based on inaccurate performance evaluations. 257
To create liability for defamation, a plaintiff must show: (1) a false
249. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524, 1533 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) and Norris v. Moskin Stores, Inc., 132 So.
2d 321 (Ala. 1961) (citing WILLIAM L. PRossER, LAw OF TORTS, 637-39 (2d ed. 1955))).
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652B (1977) (emphasis added).
251. See, e.g., Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1534; Housh v. Peth, 135 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App.
1955).
252. Phillips, 711 F.2d at 1534.
253. 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
254. Id. at 711.
255. Id. at 712.
256. See, e.g., Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523 (D.D.C. 1981)
(finding the plaintiff stated a claim for invasion of privacy by alleging that her supervisor had
repeatedly called her at home and at work and made leering comments to her about her sex life).
257. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079, at *6 (N.D.
I11. Mar. 10, 1993). Another basis for a defamation suit in the sexual harassment context is
illustrated by Garcia v. Williams, 704 F. Supp. 984, 1001-02 (N.D. Cal. 1988), cert. dismissed
sub nom. Montanez v. O'Nalty, No. CV-93-0522643S, 1994 WL 146376 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr.
6, 1994), in which a judge's false remarks to others implying that a secretary was romantically
interested in him were held sufficient to state a defamation claim.
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and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged
publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence
on the part of the publisher; and (4) either actionability of the state-
ment irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
caused by the publication. 28 If a direct statement of facts would be
defamatory, then a statement of an opinion which implies the exis-
tence of those false facts is also defamatory. 259 Furthermore, one can-
not avoid liability by phrasing a defamatory comment as a question.
260
The court in Isaacson v. Keck, Mahin & Cate discussed the tort of
defamation in the context of employment performance evaluation. 26'
Oddly, while acknowledging that a false statement that another per-
son is incapable of performing her profession is defamatory per se, 26
2
and that '[a] false statement which imputes a lack of ability in one's
profession is actionable as defamation,' ' 263 the Isaacson court none-
theless held that the plaintiff failed to allege a defamatory assertion of
fact because her supervisor's statements were subjective appraisals of
her performance, that is, opinions. 264
The overwhelming weight of authority holds that at-will employ-
ment relationships are protected against unlawful interference by third
parties. 265 The elements of intentional interference with an employ-
ment relationship include the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of
continued employment; knowledge of the business relationship by the
interferer; intentional interference with that relationship; and damage
caused by the interference. 266 One major limitation is that it does not
permit employer liability, because the nature of the wrong is a third
party's interference with the employer-employee relationship. 267 A sec-
258. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
259. Henderson v. Pennwalt Corp., 704 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
260. Id.; see also WnLLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 741 (1971)
("The form of the statement is not important, so long as the defamatory meaning is con-
veyed .... ).
261. Isaacson, No. 92-C3105, 1993 WL 68079, at *6-*7. The facts of the case are discussed
supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
262. Id. at *6 (citing Powers v. Delnor Hosp., 499 N.E.2d 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
263. Id. (quoting Erickson v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 469 N.E.2d 679 (I11. App. Ct. 1984)).
264. Id. at *7.
265. WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES 212 (2d ed. 1985).
266. Id. at 211; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).
267. See Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 883 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (holding
that at-will employee has contract right that may not be unlawfully interfered with by third
party; agent who fires employee without absolute authority is subject to liability for intentional
interference with employment relations); see also Note, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1461, 1480 (1986) (discussing advantages and
disadvantages of the intentional interference with an employment contract tort for victims of
sexual harassment).
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ond limitation is that the plaintiff must prove economic harm; the tort
may not be invoked to redress mental injuries. 268 Nevertheless, sexual
harassment plaintiffs have won claims for intentional interference
with contractual relations. 26 9
E. Tort and Contract Actions for Wrongful Discharge
1. Contract Action for Wrongful Discharge
If an employment contract does not contain an express or implied
provision that the employment is for a specific term, the employee is
an employee at-will, meaning the contract is terminable at the option
of either party.270 Several theories of relief are available to protect at-
will employees, but states differ as to the theories upon which they
will allow a cause of action to be premised.2 7'
In some states, it is possible to state a claim in contract for wrong-
ful discharge based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 272 However, some states' at-will employment rules,
including those of Florida and Georgia, preclude claims for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in wrongful dis-
charge cases. 273 Alternatively, an employee manual may create an im-
plied contract for a definite period of employment or an implied
contractual obligation not to discharge the employee without cause,
upon which a breach of contract action can be based. 274
2. Tort Action for Wrongful Discharge
In most jurisdictions, a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge
exists, which requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that a specific pub-
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., Guyette v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 521 (D.N.J. 1981); Tash v.
Houston, 254 N.W.2d 579 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
270. Wolk v. Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., No. 82-874, 1983 WL 598, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8,
1983) (not reported in Federal Supplement), aff'd, 728 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1984).
271. See infra notes 272-74.
272. See supra note 270, at *2 and n.3.
273. See, e.g., Thomason v. Mitsubishi Elec. Sales Am., Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1563, 1565 (N.D.
Ga. 1988); Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (citing Muller v. Stromberg,
Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)), review denied, 553 So. 2d 1165 (Fla.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990).
274. See, e.g., Lane v. K-Mart Corp., 378 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. App. Ct. 1989); Garmon v.
Health Group of Atlanta, Inc., 359 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. App. Ct. 1987); Swanson v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 354 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. App. Ct. 1987); see generally Note, Employee Handbooks
and Employment-at- Will Contracts, 1985 DuKE L.J. 196 (1985) (discussing traditional employee
handbook doctrine and the rapid evolution of judicial attitude into a more liberal position).
1994] SEXUAL HARASSMENT
lic policy against employment discrimination and sexual harassment,
preferably one evidenced by a statute, warrants a limitation on the
employer's right to discharge an employee at-will. 27" Nevertheless,
state and federal antidiscrimination statutes may preempt wrongful
termination actions in both tort and contract.
27 6
The rule in Florida is that, absent a specific statute granting a prop-
erty interest, if the term of employment is discretionary with either
party or is indefinite, then either party may terminate the employment
at any time, with or without cause, and no action may be maintained
for breach of the employment contract.2 7 Moreover, Florida does not
recognize an exception to the at-will doctrine in the form of a com-
mon law tort for retaliatory discharge.
27 18
V. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
A. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct as a Model for Comparison
Courts routinely discipline judges for sexual harassment under the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("Judi-
275. See, e.g., Wolk, 1983 WL 598, at *2; Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Brad-
street, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983).
276. Kenneth J. Kelly, Workplace Litigation 1993, at 7 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 476, 1993).
Antidiscrimination statute provides exclusive remedy: See Eklof v. Bramalea Ltd., 733 F.
Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provided statutory remedy pre-
cluding assertion of tort action for wrongful discharge based on discrimination); Harrison v.
Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (dismissing wrongful
discharge suit based on sexual harassment because public policy exception does not apply when
statutory remedy exists), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991); Horbaczewsky
v. Spider Staging Sales Co., 621 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (declining to imply right of action
for retaliatory discharge arising from sexual harassment in view of comprehensive federal and
state antidiscrimination laws in Title VII and Illinois Human Rights Act); Grzyb v. Evans, 700
S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) (although Kentucky recognizes public policy exception to the at-will doc-
trine, Kentucky antidiscrimination law preempts any common law causes of action for sex-based
discrimination).
Antidiscrimination statute not exclusive: See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1990) (the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) does not bar an employee's sex discrimination and sex-
ual harassment claims); Carmichael v. Alfano Temporary Personnel, 285 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (FEHA remedies not exclusive).
277. See Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983);
DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 384 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1980). Furthermore, a statutory
provision that requires minimal procedural steps prior to termination does not ipso facto create a
property interest in continued employment. Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA
1989) (citing Zeigler v. Jackson, 716 F.2d 847 (11th Cir 1983)), review denied, 553 So. 2d 1165
(Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990).
278. Smith v. Piezo Technology & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
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cial Code").279 Canons 2 and 3 of the Judicial Code not only require
judges themselves to refrain from manifesting gender-based bias or
prejudice,20 which manifestations include membership in an organiza-
tion that discriminates,"' but also obligate judges to hold attorneys
and subordinates to the same standard of conduct. 282 Moreover,
Canon 3.B.(5) prohibits sexual harassment specifically and requires
judges to hold "others subject to the judge's direction and control" to
the same standard of conduct. 23 The commentary to Canon 4.A.(I)
explains further that it is inappropriate for a judge to tell jokes or
make other remarks demeaning individuals based on their sex. 
2a
One judge who was removed from office for his sexual misconduct
asked a third-year law student in his chambers to take off her clothes
and bend over; hugged a docket clerk and unlatched her bra strap
while making a comment to the effect that he hadn't lost his touch;
told a prosecutor that he "would really like to jump [her] bones";
winked and blew a kiss to a different attorney in the presence of her
client and other courtroom observers; and responded to a student in-
tern's comment that "Miss [Name] is here on a matter that will be
very quick" by retorting: "Oh, she's here for a quickie, uh. ' ' 211 Other
judges have been disciplined for engaging in sexual relations with fe-
male juvenile wards under their jurisdiction; 286 requiring employees to
engage in sexual relations as a condition of employment and firing
one for refusing to do so;287 offering female defendants leniency in
exchange for sexual favors;28 engaging in sex with a female juror in
chambers while a chief deputy guarded the door, while at the same
time involving himself in an unethical arrangement with a bail bonds-
man who "lined up" women for the judge to "take oUt"; 29 and mis-
using office to "prolong a sexual relationship with a law assistant
and, later, to exact personal vengeance when she refused to continue
279. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons 2.C., 3.B.(5), (6), 4.A. (1990). See Angel, su-
pra note 16, for a more comprehensive discussion of this topic.
280. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3.B.(5) (1990).
281. Id. Canon 2.C.
282. Id. Canons 3.B.(5), (6).
283. Id. Canon 3.B.(5).
284. Commentary to MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4.A.
285. See In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 654-57, amended, 744 P.2d 340 (Wash. 1987).
286. See Angel, supra note 16, at 823 (citing AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL Dis-
CIPLINE AND DIGEST KY 4 (Jan. 1981-June 1986) (judge resigned and was publicly censured)).
287. See In re Hammond, 585 P.2d 1066 (Kan. 1978) (holding that conduct warranted at
least public censure and six months' suspension without pay, and perhaps removal from office).
288. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Hardesty, 775 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1989) (holding that public
censure and one-year suspension from practice of law were appropriate penalties).
289. See In re Kivett, 309 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. 1983) (removing Judge Kivett from office).
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their affair." 290 The vengeance included firing the clerk, emptying her
office desk and dumping the contents on the doorstep of her resi-
dence, leaving more than sixty obscene messages on her answering
machine, falsely identifying himself to her doorman as her attorney in
a desperate attempt to see her, threatening to have her boyfriend fired
if he did not reveal her whereabouts, asking the Deputy Chief Admin-
istrative Judge to view unfavorably any application that the law clerk
might submit, and remonstrating with the clerk's new employer for
hiring her without first consulting him.29'
Neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model
Code") nor the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") addresses sex discrimination or the more specific issue of sex-
ual harassment. However, sexual harassment of clients by attorneys
has been held to violate the "catch-all" provision of the Model Code,
which states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in any other conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.' '292 Moreover,
Judge Miera, who made unwelcome sexual advances to his male court
reporter and who, on another occasion, touched a female employee's
breast while offering her money for coffee she had bought, was disci-
plined under a provision of the Minnesota lawyer code that replicates
Model Code DR 1-102(A)(6). 293 The court specifically found that such
misconduct is "no less troubling when engaged in by an attorney"
and publicly reprimanded him in his capacity as a lawyer as well. 294
Minnesota, along with several other states, has since enacted an
amendment to its lawyer code proscribing both violations of antidis-
crimination laws generally and sexual harassment specifically. 295
B. Lawyer Discipline for Sexual Harassment of Clients
In April 1991, the State Bar of California became the first to ap-
prove a professional conduct rule prohibiting lawyers from "demand-
290. See In re Gelfand, 512 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y.) (removing Judge Gelfand from office), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987).
291. Id.
292. MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(6) (1981); see, e.g., In re Peters, 428 N.W.2d 375 (Minn.
1988); In re Liebowitz, 516 A.2d 246 (N.J. 1985); In re Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind. 1981).
293. See In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850 (Minn. 1988) (although Board on Judicial Standards
recommended Judge Miera's removal, court ordered only public censure and one-year suspen-
sion without pay).
294. Id. at 859.
295. See MINNESOTA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1992). It reads, in part, "It
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (g) harass a person on the basis of sex .... in
connection with a lawyer's professional activities; [or] (h) commit a discriminatory act, prohib-
ited by federal, state or local statute or ordinance, that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness
as a lawyer .... Id.; see also NEw J RSEY RULES OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g)
(1990) (prohibits a lawyer from discriminating based on sex where the conduct is intended to or
is likely to cause harm and the conduct is engaged in while acting in the attorney's professional
capacity).
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ing or requiring" sexual relations with clients. The rule states that a
bar member may not continue representing a client "if a sexual rela-
tionship causes the attorney to perform legal services incompetently,"
and placing the burden of proof on the attorney. 296 The need for a
similar rule prohibiting sexual harassment of female attorneys and
staff by male attorneys is even more compelling. In addition to the
psychological and financial repercussions common to sexual harass-
ment of both employees and clients,297 sexual harassment of employ-
ees damages its victims' professional futures. And, like sexual
harassment of clients by attorneys, condoning sexual harassment of
employees by attorneys undermines the integrity of and the public's
confidence in the profession, and sends a message to the public that
such demoralizing conduct is acceptable and that it typifies the legal
profession.29
C. Criminal Sanctions and Mandatory Education Laws Addressing
Workplace Harassment
In some places, legislatures have passed strict laws designed to curb
workplace harassment. 299 For example, Maine requires employers to
educate workers about sexual harassment by posting notices stating
that sexual harassment is illegal and by explaining how to file a com-
plaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission.' ° The state also
requires employers with fifteen or more workers to conduct training
about sexual harassment for all new employees within one year after
they are hired.30 1 France and Spain have imposed criminal sanctions of
up to one year in prison for workplace harassment 0 2
D. State Codes of Professional Lawyer Conduct
Lawyers in the District of Columbia, Florida, Minnesota, New Jer-
sey, New York, Rhode Island and Vermont have responded to dis-
criminatory practices by enacting amendments to their state codes of
296. Sex Abuse Goes on Trial: Pressure Builds For Rules on Law-Office Sex, FIN. POST,
Nov. 14, 1991, § 1, at 14,
297. See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
298. See CHsiALEs W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETiucs § 3.1, at 81-82 (1986).
299. See infra notes 300-02 and accompanying text.
300. Maine Sex Harassment Law Seeks Firms'Help, CHi. TRIE., Oct. 18, 1991, at C6.
301. Id.
302. Donald C. Dowling, Jr., EC Employment Law After Maastricht: "Continental Social
Europe"?, 27 A.B.A. SEc. INT'L LAW & PRAC. I n.j 14 (Spring 1993).
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professional conduct to prohibit such practices.3 3 Florida, for exam-
ple, amended Rule 4-8.4(d)3 4 to state that a lawyer shall not "engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, includ-
ing to . . .disparage, humiliate or discriminate against litigants, ju-
rors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on account of...
gender .... ,,301 Minnesota's amended rule 8.4 explicitly prohibits
sexual harassment.3°6 The Law Society of Upper Canada also recently
made sexual harassment by lawyers a ground of professional miscon-
duct that could lead to disbarment.30
California, Massachusetts,0 8 and Michigan have proposed such
amendments to their states' professional codes, and a Hawaii Su-
preme Court committee is drafting an antidiscrimination rule for that
state's code of professional conduct. 3°9 Michigan's proposed rule 5.7
would restrict lawyers' conduct both in professional and private life. 10
California's proposed rules, like New Jersey's amended rule, restrict
an attorney's conduct in a professional capacity only .31
E. The Next Step
The ABA's Model Rules, as well as every state's lawyer code of
professional responsibility, should be amended to specifically con-
demn sexual harassment of employees by lawyers. Courts must disci-
pline lawyers not just to punish them, but also to protect the public,
the administration of justice, and the integrity of the bar.31 2 Sanctions
303. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 9.1 (1992); FLORIDA
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-8.4(d) (1994); MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1992); NEW YORK CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIIUTY DR 1-102(A)(6)
(1992); NEW JERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(g) (1993); RHODE ISLAND RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d) (1991-92); VERMONT CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONStBIL-
rry DR 1-102(A)(6) (1986).
304. See The Florida Bar Re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d
720 (Fla. 1993) (approving the amendment).
305. Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
306. See supra note 295. '
307. Sexual Harassment, Spelled Out, ToRorro STAR, Apr. 8, 1993, at A21.
308. See Linda M. Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Lawyer-Client Sexual Contact: State
Bars Polled, NAT'L L.J., June 15, 1992, at 27 n.5 (discussing Massachusetts' proposed antidiscri-
mination amendment).
309. H. Baird Kidwell, Summary of Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct, HAW. B.I.,
Sept. 1993, at 20.
310. See MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Rule 5.7 (1988).
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should be imposed to educate and deter unethical conduct by the of-
fending lawyer and all members of the legal profession." 3 None of
these purposes can be served while the legal profession continues to
condone the reprehensible abuse of power by lawyers. Furthermore, if
the legal profession truly desires to deter sexual harassment, sanctions
imposed in response to such behavior must be commensurate with the
violations. Measured by such a standard, sanctions typically imposed
for sexual misconduct by judges are woefully inadequate." 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment in law firms is a widespread problem that dam-
ages its victims' careers, law firms' financial statuses, employee pro-
ductivity and morale, workplace atmospheres, working and mentoring
relationships between male and female lawyers within an office, client
confidence in their legal counsel, and the public image of the legal
profession generally. The first step toward avoiding these repercus-
sions is to educate all firm personnel. This should include explaining
what is and what is not sexual harassment and, while recognizing dif-
fering viewpoints, making clear the fact that sexual harassment will
not be tolerated and will be handled promptly and effectively. Manda-
tory sexual harassment education should be part of every employee's
orientation, should be repeated periodically, and should include sensi-
tivity training to reduce possible backlash to the policy, such as resent-
ment toward, disparate treatment of, or avoidance of female
attorneys and staff. Effective detection and enforcement mechanisms
should be in place to ensure a prompt and adequate response to any
problem or potential problem that may arise. The policy should be
communicated to business associates outside the firm as well.
Furthermore, every state's lawyer code should be amended to pro-
hibit sexual harassment and other forms of sex discrimination by law-
yers. It is unacceptable for state bars to countenance among its
members abusive, morally reprehensible conduct that is condemned
and prohibited by both state and federal law.
Finally, state supreme courts should impose sanctions severe
enough to send a clear message that sexual misconduct will not be
tolerated in the legal workplace and to make it worthwhile for victims
of harassment to come forward.
313. Id. at 80.
314. See, e.g., supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
